Seattle Pacific University

Digital Commons @ SPU
Honors Projects

University Scholars

Spring 5-22-2021

The Realistic Desirability of Perfection in Thomas More’s Utopia
and John Milton’s Paradise Lost
Eryn Tan
Seattle Pacific University

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/honorsprojects
Part of the English Language and Literature Commons, and the Social and Behavioral Sciences
Commons

Recommended Citation
Tan, Eryn, "The Realistic Desirability of Perfection in Thomas More’s Utopia and John Milton’s Paradise
Lost" (2021). Honors Projects. 133.
https://digitalcommons.spu.edu/honorsprojects/133

This Honors Project is brought to you for free and open access by the University Scholars at Digital Commons @
SPU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Projects by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @
SPU.

Tan 1

THE REALISTIC DESIRABILITY OF PERFECTION IN THOMAS MORE’S UTOPIA
AND JOHN MILTON’S PARADISE LOST
by
ERYN TAN ZHI YING

FACULTY MENTORS:
TOM AMOROSE, JEFF KEUSS

HONORS PROGRAM DIRECTOR:
DR. CHRISTINE CHANEY

A project submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Bachelor of Arts degree
in Honors Liberal Arts Seattle Pacific University 2021

Presented at the SPU Honors Research Symposium
Date: 22 May 2021

Tan 2
Abstract
This paper analyzes Thomas More’s Utopia and John Milton’s Paradise Lost to investigate
the realistic desirability of perfection. The practices that ensure perfection in Thomas More’s
Utopia are realistically applied to society to determine if such practices would be feasible,
accepted, or desired in society. Meanwhile, the reactions and comments on the lost perfection
of the Garden of Eden in John Milton’s Paradise Lost are analyzed as a template for
navigating a fallen, imperfect world. By studying these two literary works together, this paper
seeks to investigate the realistic desirability of perfection in society and the effects of chasing
perfection.
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The Realistic Desirability of Perfection in Thomas More’s Utopia and John Milton’s
Paradise Lost
1. Introduction
Thomas More’s Utopia and John Milton’s Paradise Lost both discuss perfect worlds
and ideal societies. Yet, both literary works also suggest how that perfection is unrealistic and
undesirable. More’s Utopia describes the religious, social, and political practices that ensure
the prosperity and stability of a perfect island society called Utopia. On the surface, it seems
like the author approves of Utopian practices since Hythloday so fervently recommends them
to More’s character. However, the closing comments and critiques on Utopian practices by
both characters create a mood of ambivalence towards Utopian practices, thus leading readers
to question the realistic desirability of Utopian practices in an actual human society.
Meanwhile, Milton’s Paradise Lost describes the original Garden of Eden and how we lost
that perfection. Adam and Eve’s sin is explicitly bemoaned and lamented, but then several
characters provide consolation by suggesting how something better shall be achieved through
the Fall. Though their reasonings differ, Milton and More both posit through their works that
though humanity thinks they desire perfection, they actually prefer contexts of imperfection.
Milton suggests how our fallenness gives us the opportunity to achieve greater joys than what
we had in the Garden of Eden while More suggests how human pride makes perfection
impossible and undesirable to humanity.
Since many Utopian practices require people to completely ignore their prideful
instincts, humanity’s pride would ultimately reject and rebel against the measures required to
ensure the social and economic stability in a perfect, utopian society. Hythloday and More’s
character reflect this argument in their closing comments. As the text ends, Hythloday once
again praises Utopian practices and wishes that the world would be so wise as to imitate
them, but he also admits that it would be unrealistic to implement Utopian practices in the
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world because human pride would be too big a hindrance (More 146). Meanwhile, More’s
character states that there are many Utopian practices he wishes to see in the world’s
governments, though he cannot agree with all the Utopian practices described by Hythloday
(148). These comments imply that humanity will agree with a perfect society in the abstract,
as Hythloday and More both praise Utopia and wish for the world to imitate their practices.
However, Hythloday admits how pride reduces the feasibility of those practices in a real
society while More doubts the desirability of those practices. Meanwhile, several characters
in Milton’s Paradise Lost overtly support my argument that humanity shall achieve greater
joys through the Fall. For example, as the angel Michael is escorting Adam and Eve out of
Eden, he comforts them by saying, “[thou] shalt possess/ A Paradise within thee, happier far”
(Milton 12.586-7). So, Milton suggests that the Fall, despite descending humanity into a state
of imperfection, allows humanity to achieve greater happiness within that imperfect state. In
this paper, I will explore the various ways in which human pride rejects perfection in More’s
Utopia, and the various ways in which humanity may achieve greater joys through their
imperfections in Milton’s Paradise Lost.
Human pride may be interpreted as either a sinful pride (such as arrogance, vanity, or
conceit) or a healthy pride (such as self-esteem or dignity). Hythloday’s reference to human
pride seems to assume the first meaning, asserting how Utopia would be a perfect society if
sinful pride did not reject it. My paper will use both interpretations of human pride to show
how Utopian perfection would be rejected. My first two points use the first interpretation of
sinful pride to heighten how humanity is imperfect and will thus not accept or fit in a perfect
world or society. I supplement these points with my analysis of Milton’s Paradise Lost that
suggests how we are happier in imperfect contexts anyways. My last two points use the
second interpretation of healthy pride to highlight how Utopian perfection necessarily
violates humanity’s self-worth and dignity, and does not allow humanity to redeem their
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fallenness by striving against evil. I strengthen these points with my analysis of Milton’s
Paradise Lost that shows how contexts of imperfection do allow for these things.

2. Alternative Readings of Both Texts
A few counterarguments posit how More’s Utopian practices are endorsing and
encouraging realistic societal reforms, such as the Utopian practice of religious freedom. In
“Religious Freedom in Thomas More's Utopia”, Sanford Kessler asserts how “Thomas More
advocated religious freedom in Utopia to promote civic peace in Christendom and to help
unify his fractious Catholic Church” (Kessler). He supports his interpretation by analyzing
how religious Utopian practices influence their society. For example, he posits how they
created a “limited type of religious freedom [that] made Utopia a theologically diverse, but
morally unified society wholly free of religiously inspired violence” (Kessler). This analysis
is supported by the Utopian law that “every man might be of what religion he pleased, and
might endeavor to draw others to it by the force of argument and by amicable and modest
ways, but without bitterness [or] violence” (More 129). This law allows Utopians the
freedom to choose their own religion, while also preventing any religious antipathies.
Kessler also acknowledges how Hythloday describes pride as a “plague of human
nature” (More 146) that would obstruct religious freedom, but accounts for this pride by
positing how “the Utopians took a certain pride in forming and maintaining their own
religious opinions without endangering their commonwealth” (Kessler). This is supported by
the opinions of the Utopians’ leader, Utopus, who thought that God “might inspire man in a
different manner, and be pleased with this variety” (More 129). This belief accounts for
human pride as Utopians may now take pride in their diverse forms of religion as being
pleasing to God in its variety. So, Kessler strongly supports his views on religious Utopian
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practices being a model for social reform in society, though even he must acknowledge that
pride would be an obstacle that must be circumvented.
Another counterargument to my thesis is Jennifer Bishop’s argument in “‘Utopia’ and
Civic Politics in Mid-Sixteenth-Century London” that More’s Utopia reveals of “an
engagement with ideas of 'good government'” (Bishop 933) and “[exists] as part of a dialogue
of reform” (952). Bishop supports her argument by exploring the historical context of the
mid-sixteenth century when commonwealth reforms were being heavily emphasized:
“contributions to commonwealth reform in the mid-sixteenth century could take a variety of
forms, including new legislation, such as the Vagrancy Act; re-founded institutions, such as
the Royal Hospitals; and the publication of new or translated texts, such as Utopia” (951).
Bishop also asserts how “each of these forms provided a framework within which civic
reform could be conceptualized, discussed, or enacted” (951). More’s text reflects Bishop’s
assertion, in that the text discusses the political and social practices in Utopia, such as how
their society elects their “Prince”, “Philarch”, and “Archphilarch” (More 59). Then Bishop
supports her argument that Utopia is part of a dialogue of reform by referencing Sara Rees
Jones’s argument that More modelled Utopia’s capital city, Amaurotum, after London to
suggest to Londoners the higher purpose of their own civic institutions (Bishop 951). Bishop
supports this argument with historical context as she states how “this ‘reminder’ would have
been particularly relevant during the Edwardian reformation, when the control of poverty and
vagrancy became a civic responsibility after the dissolution of religious houses and
institutions” (951). Overall, though Bishop’s argument of Utopia being a realistic call for
reform is strongly supported by historical evidence and other scholars, her argument lacks
textual evidence and does not address the realistic desirability of those Utopian reforms when
implemented in an actual human society.
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Several arguments are also made against my interpretation of Milton’s Paradise Lost,
such as Noam Reisner’s argument that Paradise Lost sees humanity’s Fall as inauspicious
and damning. In John Milton's “Paradise Lost”: A Reading Guide, Reisner argues that
“Adam and Eve’s loss of paradise [was] for Milton…an event of calamitous moral and
spiritual error which mankind has slavishly repeated throughout its fallen history” (Reisner
1). In Milton’s eyes, humanity’s Fall in Paradise Lost symbolized a “triumph of tyranny over
human weakness” (1) and a loss of “the single perfection and material unity of the one true
God” (9) that humanity enjoyed before the Fall. This interpretation is supported by Milton’s
own opening comments on humanity’s Fall. In Book 1, Milton begins his poem by describing
“Man’s first disobedience [that…]/ Brought death into the World, and all our woe/ With loss
of Eden” (Milton 1.1-4). “Man’s first disobedience” alludes to the original sin that caused
humanity’s Fall, while the diction used to describe that Fall (“death”, “woe”, “loss”) heaps
overtly negative connotations on it. This suggests that Milton has a negative perspective on
humanity’s Fall, and that he views the Fall as the root of all the sorrow and pain in the world.
Milton also depicts God as viewing humanity’s Fall inauspiciously. God sends an angel to
warn Adam and Eve of “how [Satan] designs/ In them at once to ruin all mankind” (5.22728). God’s warning implies how the original sin will destroy mankind, tainting their
perfection. So, there are several areas of Paradise Lost that support Reisner’s unfavourable
interpretation of the Fall.
There are also scholars who see Milton’s Paradise Lost as a tragedy of free will and a
condemnation of Adam and Eve as being responsible for the Fall. In “Eve and the Doctrine of
Responsibility in Paradise Lost”, Stella P. Revard argues that “the responsibility for [the Fall]
lies with the husband who sanctioned [Eve’s] exposure [to Satan as this] creates the climate
for her fall” (Revard 69). This is supported by the text as Adam is depicted as being wiser
than Eve and reluctant to separate from her. He warns Eve, “Firm we subsist, yet possible to
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swerve” (Milton 9.359), predicting how they may “fall into [Satan’s] deception unaware”
(9.362). Since Adam was wiser and more prudent, his failure to advise and “shape his wife's
decisions” leads to him “approving her freedom [and thus causing] her fall and his own”
(Revard 69). This is shown in how Adam is aware of the dangers of separating, yet he agrees
to separate from Eve, thus willingly exposing them both to greater temptation.
Revard also supports her argument by noting how the Son assigns responsibility to
Adam in Paradise Lost: “The Son [asserts] that Adam alone was responsible for his own sin.
Yet he [also] makes Adam's responsibility almost directly proportionate to the degree he
excelled Eve and was set in perfection and real dignity above her” (71). When Adam tries to
blame the Fall on Eve, the Son reminds Adam that “God set [Adam] above her” (Milton
10.149) and that Adam’s “perfection far excelled/ Hers in all real dignity” (10.150-51). That
being said, the Son asks Adam why “to [Eve]/ [he] didst resign [his] manhood” (10.147-48).
The Son’s speech charges Adam for not guiding Eve’s decisions and for not preventing her
exposure to temptation. This supports Revard’s claim that Adam is responsible for the Fall in
Paradise Lost. So far, I have discussed several arguments that refute my thesis or offer
alternative interpretations. Nevertheless, I believe that my interpretations are beneficial and
strongly supported by the texts, and I shall now begin supporting my arguments.

3. Aversion to Rebuke, Joy of Forgiveness
Several practices of the Utopians suggest the impracticality, from a humanist point of
view, of this ideal society ever being realized. For instance, the Utopian practice of constant
surveillance, which aims to reduce vice through rebukes and instructions from others, would
be rejected as our sinful, human pride would rebel against constant chastisement and orders
from others. Thomas I. White supports this idea in “Festivitas, Utilitas, et Opes: The
Concluding Irony and Philosophical Purpose of Thomas More's "Utopia"” as he argues how

Tan 10
“More consistently condemns common or public opinion as a guide to one's beliefs and
actions” (White 141). More’s disapproval of being guided by public opinion suggests his
ironic, rather than sincere, approach to Utopian surveillance practices that encourage
Utopians to base their actions on the judgement of others. This ironic interpretation is
supported by Hythloday’s stating that Utopian practices would be difficult to implement in
other societies as sinful pride is an “infernal serpent that creeps into the breasts of mortals,
and possesses them too much to be easily drawn out” (More 146). This comment satirizes
previously commended Utopian practices as it suggests how human pride will realistically
hinder the adoption of those practices. Initially, the Utopian practice where young people sit
interspersed by the older people at mealtimes is commended for the fact that “the gravity of
the old people, and the reverence that is due to them, might restrain the younger from all
indecent words and gestures” (73). However, realistically, having society base their actions
on the opinions of others may be counterintuitive since “common opinion is not shaped by
reason and virtue, and it is therefore an unreliable guide to morality” (White 141). A satirical
reading that factors in human pride also suggests that the young people will rebel against
constantly having an elder “observe [their] temper” (More 74) as they will feel belittled and
micromanaged, and consequently act out negatively. So, a satirical reading of Utopian
practices of surveillance reveal how human pride would rebel against the desired outcomes of
those practices.
This argument is supported by Ronald Huebert’s “Privacy: The Early Social History
of a Word” where he posits that More’s “comprehensive, unrelenting network of [Utopian]
surveillance” (Huebert 22) is merely an ironic method of underscoring the importance of
privacy in society. This ironic reading supports my satirical interpretation of Utopian
practices as it suggests how those practices are realistically undesirable. Huebert describes
Utopian surveillance as “worse than being followed incessantly by the ever-watchful eye of

Tan 11
Providence” (22) as the reality of Utopian surveillance would be unnerving and
overwhelming. For example, Huebert states how “sex in Utopia is not only—and not even
principally—a private interaction between consenting adults [but rather a] subject of
responsible public planning” (23). This evaluation is supported by the text as Utopian couples
are presented naked to each other before marriage to prevent any hidden defects (More 104).
Huebert’s overt aversion to this practice provides an example of a Utopian practice of
surveillance that would be rejected by human society, thus supporting my argument.
Huebert supports the impracticality of Utopian practices of surveillance as he
analyzes Andrew Marvell’s poems to show how privacy is important in protecting human
pride: “what protects the speaker from outright ridicule is the fact that he's completely alone”
(Huebert 24). Establishing this importance strengthens Huebert’s claim that More is
describing ironically Utopian practices of surveillance. He supports this claim by noting how
“Hythloday” and “Utopia” are ironic names as they respectively mean “purveyor of
nonsense” and “nowhere” (27). Heubert provides various pieces of evidence to support his
claim that More depicts Utopian practices of surveillance ironically in order to underscore the
importance of privacy in society. This ironic interpretation addresses how Utopian practices
of surveillance are realistically abhorrent and how human pride requires an opposing
practice: privacy. So, Heubert supports my claim that More depicts Utopian practices of
surveillance satirically to highlight how those practices would be rejected by human pride.
Contrasting the constant chastisement and rebukes that our pride would reject in the
perfect Utopian society, Milton suggests that humanity’s fallenness and imperfections lead us
to greater joys by allowing us to experience God in new and different ways, such as through
His mercy, grace, and forgiveness. John T. Shawcross supports this argument in With Mortal
Voice: The Creation of Paradise Lost as he asserts how “we are all blind until we have
experienced the trials of being mortal and have then bathed ourselves in the spirituality of
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God's Logos” (Shawcross 16). So, through our fallenness, we experience more of God and
thus achieve greater joy and spirituality. God’s mercy and forgiveness are foreshadowed by
the angel Abdiel’s involvement with Satan and God’s pardoning of the angel’s error. After
rebuking and rejecting Satan, Abdiel returns to heaven where God, instead of rebuking or
punishing Abdiel, forgives Abdiel and praises him for returning. God says to Abdiel,
“Servant of God. Well done; well hast thou fought/ The better fight” (Milton 6.29-30),
praising Abdiel for seeking “To stand approved in sight of God” (6.36). Though God could
condemn Abdiel for leaving Him to follow Satan, God instead shows His mercy and
forgiveness by accepting Abdiel back into heaven and commending him for returning. This
event foreshadows how humanity will also receive God’s mercy and forgiveness after they
sin, thus achieving greater joys by experiencing the fullness of God.
This comes to pass as God reacts to the Fall by sending the Son, a merciful and loving
character who will sacrifice Himself to redeem humanity, to judge Adam and Eve. God’s
deliberate choice of such a judge for Adam and Eve demonstrates the love and mercy He
offers humanity after the Fall. As Shawcross asserts, “The subject of man's disobedience has
been used to exhibit the theme of God's love” (Shawcross 27). God confesses “I intend/
Mercy” (Milton 10.58-59) in sending the Son, who is “Man’s friend, his mediator” (10.60).
In turn, the Son proclaims that He will “mitigate their doom/ On [Him] derived” (10.76-77)
and “temper so Justice with mercy” (10.77-78). This conversation displays how God treats
humanity’s sin with loving mercy. So, despite the Fall and the doom it imposed on humanity,
a greater joy is achieved by humanity as God now offers mercy and forgiveness, something
we could not experience in our pre-Fall state of perfection. Instead of the constant rebukes
required in a perfect Utopian society, Milton suggests that humanity’s imperfections allow
them to experience forgiveness and mercy.
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Further contrasting the unrelenting surveillance of Utopia that aims to reproach
individuals and command them to perfection, Milton focuses on how humanity’s
imperfections open them up to receiving God’s divine and healing grace. Benjamin Myers
reflects this view in “Prevenient Grace and Conversion in Paradise Lost” as he argues that
“the Fall is seen in its proper light only when it is viewed in relation to the ensuing
intervention of the grace of God” (Myers 21). This grace is predicted in the opening lines of
Paradise Lost as Milton foreshadows how, after the Fall, “one greater Man/ [will] Restore us,
and regain the blissful seat” (Milton 1.4-5). Both God and the Son also mention the grace that
will be offered to a fallen humanity; even as God predicts the Fall, He promises that
“Man…shall find grace” (3.131); the Son repeats this promise, stating how “Man shall find
grace” (3.227) and how grace will “find means, that finds her way/ […] to visit all [God’s]
creatures” (3. 228-30). This grace leads humanity to greater joys as they can now experience
God’s mercy and restoration. Accordingly, “the destructive power of the Fall is [overcome as
God brings] good from evil by showing grace and mercy to the fallen human race” (Myers
21). This restorative grace is described by God as He asserts how “Man shall not quite be
lost, but sav’d who will; / […through] grace in me” (Milton 3.173-74). God declares “I will
renew/ [humanity’s] lapsed powers” (3. 175-76) and promises that, “Upheld by me, yet once
more [man] shall stand/ On even ground against his mortal foe” (3. 178-79). Though the Fall
opened humanity up to imperfections, sin, and weakness, it also made humanity reliant on
God’s grace and mercy, indirectly leading humanity to attain greater joys by experiencing
God’s restorative grace. This benevolent consequence of imperfection starkly contrasts the
inauspicious requirement for Utopian perfection, that is the unrelenting surveillance that aims
to reprimand and control individuals.

4. Striving to be Better Than Others, Striving to Better Ourselves
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On another note, the Utopian practices that enforce uniformity in society would also
be rejected by sinful, human pride because human pride pushes people to strive to be
different (and thus better) than others. These human desires are admitted by Hythloday as he
states how “there is in man a pride that makes him fancy it a particular glory to excel others
in pomp and excess” (More 70). R. S. Sylvester supports this in “‘Si Hythlodaeo Credimus:
Vision and Revision in Thomas More's ‘Utopia’” as he describes Hythloday’s descriptions of
Utopia as “fanciful excursions [that ignore] the bleak contemporaneity of […] the stresses
and strains of human existence” (Sylvester 276). This suggests how Utopian practices ignore
sinful, human pride, consequently implying how human pride will inevitably create the desire
to be different and outdo others—and thus reject the Utopian practices that enforce
uniformity in society. For example, this human desire to outdo others is acknowledged by
Utopians as they take pleasure in “ordering their gardens so well [due to] an emulation
between the inhabitants of the several streets, who vie with each other” (More 57). However,
despite acknowledging this aspect of human pride, many Utopian practices do not account for
it as they enforce uniformity and thus prevent people from being different or better than
others. While Hythloday supports these practices as he “advocates a complete demolition job
on the hierarchical society of Western Europe”, More “doubts […] the validity of Utopian
practices in […] social organization” (Sylvester 281). These doubts are supported by how
many Utopian practices ignore the impacts of human pride. For example, people will rebel
against “there [being] no sort of trade that is in great esteem among [Utopians]” (More 61) as
this uniform regard prevents people from taking pride in their trade since they do not feel like
they are different or better than anyone. Next, people will reject how “throughout the island
[Utopians] wear the same sort of clothes, without any other distinction [and] the fashion
never alters” (61) as this uniform apparel prevents people from taking pride in their
appearance. Overall, several Utopian practices that enforce uniformity in society would thus
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be rejected due to humanity’s pride pressing people to try to be different (and thus better)
than others.
This argument is supported by Athanasios Moulakis’s article, “Pride and the Meaning
of ‘Utopia’”, where he asserts how More’s Utopia can only “inform the action and conduct of
[…] man, who can then seek to do the best in the circumstances and strive to right evils in
full awareness of the conditionality of […] all human […] action” (Moulakis 248). Moulakis
quotes how More himself stated that “nothing will establish [Utopia] upon this earth short of
a second coming” (247), implying how his treatise may posit ideals that cannot be realized by
human societies. This implication is supported by the fact that “Utopia” can be translated to
mean “nowhere” (More 5). So, Moulakis’s claim supports my own as we both posit how
Utopia cannot be realistically established.
Moulakis further reflects this paper’s claim as he explains how Utopia cannot be
realistically established since one condition of human actions is pride. Utopian practices do
not account for pride as “the absence of pride is the condition for the adoption of utopian
institutions, not the result of their operation” (Moulakis 254). Moulakis expands on this by
explaining how most people “would find the overwhelming sameness that goes with Utopian
equality quite unbearable” (249), thus suggesting how the Utopian practices that enforce
uniformity in society pose unrealistic expectations on people to overcome their sinful pride.
One example of the overwhelming sameness in Utopia is how they all wear similar “upper
[garments] which […] are all of one colour” (More 66). Moulakis’s analysis of Utopian
practices supports the argument that Utopian practices expect, but cannot ensure, a dismissal
of sinful, human pride and will thus be rejected as pride motivates people to try to outdo
others. Moulakis also supports this argument as he emphasizes the inevitability of the sinful
pride that is within all humans. He references “St. Benedict’s warning […] that pride is a
monster hard to extirpate even in a monastic community” (254), thus suggesting how pride
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will not be easily curbed by Utopian practices. Overall, Moulakis’s claims reflect and
strengthen the point that pride will reject the uniformity of Utopia.
Not only does sinful, human pride make us desire to be better than others by being
different from them, human pride also propels the desire to be better than others by having
more than they do and will thus lead human beings to reject Utopian practices that belittle
material wealth and gain. The authors of “On Utopia—between Philosophy and
Communism” reflect this idea as they posit how More’s “entire regime is mainly based on the
morality of the human nature, which is in itself a trap” (Pirnuta 480) since pride seems built
into human nature. Hythloday demonstrates an understanding of this inherent pride as he
states how “pride thinks its own happiness shines the brighter, by comparing it with the
misfortunes of other persons” (More 146). With this in mind, the various Utopian practices
that devalue material wealth seem unrealistic as sinful, human pride will encourage people to
have more than others by chasing material wealth and gain. One such Utopian practice that
depicts people as selflessly generous is how “when [Utopians] want anything in the country
which [their town] does not produce, they fetch that from the town, without carrying anything
in exchange for it” (54). The generosity in this practice is unrealistic because, as Hythloday
points out, human pride will lead us to desire to have more than others. This prideful human
desire will then encourage those towns to expand their land and either keep their resources or
charge other towns for them. This shows how “a regime based on human nature […] could
not be possible. Power tends to completely change a sovereign” (Pirnuta 481) as their pride
will persuade them to aggrandize themselves. So, human pride will rebel against these
Utopian practices that minimalize material wealth and gain.
Moulakis’s argument in “Pride and the Meaning of ‘Utopia’” also addresses this
claim as he explores how pride makes monetary Utopian practices unrealistic for human
societies. Moulakis acknowledges how Utopia’s “universal obligation to work [caused] the

Tan 17
absence of scarcity which is, in turn, the condition of the elimination of avarice” (Moulakis
252). However, he notes how “unlike absolute scarcity, no condition of natural abundance
and no institutions can hope to eliminate relative scarcity” (252). This relates to how sinful,
human pride is “incapable of satiation” (252) and “counts it a glorious thing to outdo others
in the vain ostentation of things” (253). Moulakis explains how the sensation of scarcity is a
feeling caused by pride that desires to have more than others and can thus never be satisfied.
This explanation strengthens my argument as it suggests how many other Utopian practices
would be rejected by human pride. For example, Utopians believe that “the folly of men has
enhanced the value of gold and silver because of their scarcity” (More 78) and thus devalue it
by giving it to prisoners and children. However, Moulakis’s argument shows how this
practice is unrealistic since, even though no one is poor, human pride will still desire to have
more gold and silver than others due to feelings of relative scarcity.
Furthermore, Moulakis notes how Utopian practices are unrealistic as they do not
account for sinful, human pride: “the Utopians apparently maintain their characteristic virtues
[…] even in situations […] where pride would certainly find scope to expand if it were
present in their breasts” (Moulakis 254). For example, when the Utopians’ “neighbours […]
desire that they would send [Utopian] magistrates to govern them” (More 110), Moulakis
posits that human pride would lead those Utopian magistrates to demonstrate “favouritism or
greed” (Moulakis 254). Overall, Moulakis argues how human pride makes the monetary
practices of Utopia unfeasible to implement in human society.
Apart from Moulakis, Warren W. Wooden’s “Anti-Scholastic Satire in Sir Thomas
More's Utopia” also supports my argument against monetary Utopian practices. Wooden
argues how More’s character in Utopia offers more realistic solutions compared to
Hythloday’s Utopian “communistic system” which only works “in Utopia where the citizens
are […] devoid of the unpleasant aspects of real people, [and thus] capable of socially
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patterned perfection” (Wooden 38). Wooden continues to state how “the obvious practical
difficulty with this [Utopian] design is that a fallible, variegated humanity will never conform
to it” (38). These assertions suggest how the monetary Utopian practices require society to be
perfect and devoid of human flaws, such as pride which will cause people to reject monetary
Utopian practices.
Wooden then expands on his argument by analysing how More’s character in Utopia
suggests how Hythloday’s argument that “the abolition of private property and money seem
to have made Utopia a paradise” is merely “grandiose theorizing” that has “dubious
applicability to the real world or the problems of real people” (39). In lieu of monetary
Utopian practices, Wooden states how More’s character suggests “a pragmatic philosophy
suited to the world as it is” (39), thus endorsing an “acceptance of reality, [and] the adoption
of a practical, workable philosophy” (39). Wooden’s analysis is supported by the text as
More’s character deems Hythloday’s theories on Utopia as “speculative philosophy” and
instead proposes “another philosophy that is more pliable, that knows its proper scene,
accommodates itself to it, and teaches a man with propriety and decency to act that part
which has fallen to his share” (More 42). This discourse reveals how More’s character deems
Utopian practices as unrealistic because it does not ‘accommodate itself’ to its ‘proper scene’
which is the flaws of humanity, such as pride. Overall, Wooden’s arguments support the idea
that monetary Utopian practices would be rejected since they do not realistically account for
human pride.
While More explores how pride seeks to be better than others and will thus reject
several practices of a perfect Utopian society, Milton explores how we achieve greater joy in
our imperfect, fallen state as we seek to better ourselves and repent to God, thus pleasing
Him. Paul Hammond supports this in “Milton's Complex Words: Essays on the Conceptual
Structure of Paradise Lost” where he explores how “before the Fall Adam and Eve were
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naked but clothed in virtue” whereas their “nakedness after sin is full of turpitude [and]
misery” (Hammond). Adam and Eve keenly feel this change in their nature, and are filled
with a “shame and misery” that is “a necessary step towards [the] fruit of repentance”
(Hammond). Adam and Eve reflect this process after the Fall, “naked left/ To guilty Shame”
(Milton 9.1057-58) as they are “destitute and bare/ Of all their virtue” (9.1062-63). Keenly
aware of their fallenness, they become “penitent” (11.5) and filled with “remorse” (11.6),
striving to fix their mistake as they “confessed/ Humbly their faults” (11.8-9) from “hearts
contrite, in sign/ Of sorrow unfeigned, and humiliation meek” (11.11-12). Humanity achieves
greater joy through this humble repentance as the Son hears Adam and Eve’s prayers and
describes humanity’s repentance as:
Fruits of more pleasing savour, from thy seed
Sown with contrition in his heart, than those
Which, his own hand manuring, all the trees
Of Paradise could have produced, ere fallen
From innocence. (11.26-30)
Due to this pleasing repentance, the Son advocates forgiveness to God, that humanity may be
“reconciled” (11.39) with God and “may dwell in joy and bliss” (11.43) with Him. So, while
human pride rejects Utopian perfection by seeking to be better than others, humanity’s
fallenness leads us to greater joys by endowing us with repentant hearts that seek to better
ourselves, which in turn please God and prompt Him to grant us greater joy and bliss.
Matthew Stallard strengthens this argument in John Milton, Paradise Lost: The
Biblically Annotated Edition as he notes all the biblical allusions in Paradise Lost that
reaffirm how God will bless those who repent to Him. Stallard notes how Adam’s plan to
confess their sins to God “from hearts contrite, in sign/ Of sorrow unfeigned, and humiliation
meek” (Milton 10.1091-92) alludes to the Bible verse, “The sacrifices of God are a contrite
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spirit: a contrite and a broken heart, O God, thou wilt not despise” (King James Version, Ps
51:17). This suggests how God will openly and eagerly accept those who repent to Him, as
implied when God promises that He will save all who desire to be saved: “Man shall not
quite be lost, but sav’d who will” (Milton 3.173). Stallard also relates Adam’s speech to 1
John 1-9: “If we acknowledge our sins, He is faithful and just, to forgive us our sins, and to
cleanse us from all unrighteousness”. This Bible verse supports how a repentant heart avails
humanity to greater joys as it allows us to be forgiven and cleansed by a faithful God. This
renewal is shown as “Prevenient grace descending had removed/ The stony from [Adam and
Eve’s] hearts, and made new flesh/ Regenerate grow instead” (Milton 11.15-17). The diction
used, such as “new” and “regenerate”, connote how God’s grace had cleansed and restored
Adam and Eve.
Moreover, Stallard analyses the angel Michael’s advice to Adam after the Fall: “thou
mayest repent, /And one bad act with many deeds well done/ Mayest cover” (11.256-57).
These lines allude to how “love shall cover the multitude of sins” (1 Peter 4:8), suggesting
how God extends His love to those who repent. This love is foreshadowed as God plans to
“place within [humanity] as a guide, /[His] umpire Conscience” (3.194-95) that those who
repent and obey Him will be led and “to the end, persisting, safe arrive” (3.197). Here, Milton
describes how humanity’s fallenness leads us to greater joys as he predicts how God will
guide us and protect us, if we repent and obey Him. So, while human pride will reject
Utopian perfection by seeking to be better than others, human imperfection will lead us to
greater joys as we please God with our repentance and allow ourselves to be renewed and
protected by Him.

5. Rejecting Overwhelming Control, Embracing Free Will
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More also describes several Utopian practices that assert an overwhelming control
over various aspects of the Utopians’ personal lives, and such practices would be rejected by
humanity’s pride because this pride (or sense of dignity and self-respect) would want people
to be in control of their own personal decisions. In “Hythloday's Utopia and More's England:
an Interpretation of Thomas More's Utopia”, Thomas S. Engeman supports this as he notes
how “the problem of freedom […] is absent [in Hythloday’s narrative as] he is unphilosophic
and exclusively oriented to practice” (Engeman 143). This suggests how certain Utopian
practices do not realistically account for humanity’s reaction to their reduced autonomy. For
example, people would reject the Utopian practice of “[shifting] their houses by lots [every
ten years]” (More 57) as it infringes on their freedom to choose and keep their living space.
The same applies to other forms of free movement. If a citizen desires to travel, they must
travel with a slave and obtain “a passport from the Prince, which both certifies the licence
that is granted for travelling, and limits the time of their return” (75). People would reject this
practice as it places several limitations on their freedom to travel, restricting them with the
requirement of being accompanied by a slave, obtaining permission from authorities, and
having limits on when they can return. Similarly onerous restrictions occur in Utopians’
marital lives. Utopians “neither allow […] polygamy nor […] divorces except in the case of
adultery or insufferable perverseness”, in these cases “the guilty are made infamous and are
never allowed the privilege of a second marriage” (105). People would reject this practice as
it overtly controls their personal and sexual lives, as a couple cannot divorce even if they both
want to while an adulterer is not allowed to marry for a second time even if someone is
willing to marry them. Though these Utopian practices theoretically promote virtue, they will
realistically be rejected by human pride as they strictly control people’s domestic, personal,
and sexual lives. This overwhelming control by Utopian practices and the Utopians’
consequent lack of autonomy and would violate our human dignity and cause our human
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pride to rebel against such Utopian practices and insist on being in control of our own
decisions. So More’s depiction of the extensive control exerted over Utopians by Utopian
practices suggests how those practices would be rejected by human pride.
This argument is supported by George M. Logan’s book,The Meaning of More's
Utopia, where he interprets More’s Utopia as a work of satire that criticizes Hythloday’s
“radical idealism” as consisting of a “closed inner world […] not open to […] correction,
compromise or the interplay of perspective” (Logan 6). One such correction or interplay of
perspective is Logan’s assessment of “the repressive character of the Utopian constitution”
(230). Though Hythloday “expresses both the characteristic libertarianism of humanism and
the relatively relaxed attitude of most humanists” (230) in Utopia, Logan reveals that
“Utopian life is highly regulated, and it exhibits all the greyness that seems an inevitable
corollary of such regulation” (230). For example, when Hythloday’s describes how a Utopian
who wants to travel “obtains leave very easily from the Syphogrant and Tranibors” (More
75), his diction suggests relaxed laws and a high degree of freedom. However, the several
other regulations of travel, such as the need for a passport, the time limit, and the mandatory
travel companion (75), support Logan’s evaluation of Utopia as being highly regulated
instead of relaxed and free. Logan’s repressive depiction of Utopia strengthens the perception
that the way Utopian practices reduce its citizens’ freedom would thus be rejected by human
pride because it insists on being free.
Logan enters another area related to human pridefulness when he shows how
“Utopian repressiveness reflects More's belief that a realistic assessment of man's nature
suggests that the goal of freedom conflicts […] with the maintenance of stability and efficient
production” (Logan 237). Logan thus argues that human beings’ natural desire for freedom
will conflict with the stability and efficient production created by the repressive Utopian
practices. This assessment supports my own argument as it reflects my claim of how
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humanity’s inherent pride (or dignity) will desire autonomy and freedom, and thus reject the
repressive Utopian practices that excessively control their lives.
Similar to More’s argument on how the overwhelming control required for Utopian
perfection would be rejected by human pride, Milton argues that humanity gains greater joys
through the Fall as we must now consciously choose to accept God’s grace. Deni Kasa
supports this argument in her article, “Arminian Theology, Machiavellian Republicanism,
and Cooperative Virtue in Milton's Paradise Lost”. Kasa argues that “instead of
overpowering believers, grace gradually regenerates them until they are again capable of
voluntarily performing acts of faith” (Kasa). This is shown after Adam and Eve receive
judgement from the Son after the Fall. At first, they languish and dwell in their sorrow, as
Adam is “to sorrow abandoned” (Milton 10.717) and Eve was “weeping [in] her lonely
plight” (10.937). But then Adam recalls “with what mild/ And gracious temper [God] both
heard and judg'd/ Without wrauth or reviling” (10.1046-48), alluding to the grace God offers
humanity, even after the Fall. The reassurance of this grace then encourages Adam to
“prostrate fall/ Before [God] reverent, and there confess/ Humbly our faults, and pardon beg”
(10.1087-89). Their initial sorrow reveals how, though grace is offered to humanity, we must
choose to accept it and be regenerated. The consequent of this acceptance is depicted as
virtue and faith as Adam and Eve humbly repent and confess their sins to God, suggesting
their intention to earnestly pursue virtue. This creates a greater joy for humanity as we may
choose to accept grace and thus be aided in our pursuit of virtue, rather than be forced to
accept grace and obliged to choose virtue.
Free will also enhances humanity’s joy as it enhances our dignity and virtue through
our conscious decision of goodness over evil. After the Fall, we are renewed by grace and
given the choice of virtue or sin. As Kasa states, “renewed righteousness [is] a capacity for
free will in the present… Milton presents agency as a gift that flows down to human beings
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from God, enabling them to pursue virtue and good works as voluntarily as Adam once did”
(Kasa). This renewed righteousness is exemplified by Adam and Eve when, after the Fall,
they reconcile with each other and seek God’s mercy together. Though initially Adam treats
Eve with “stern regard” (Milton 10.866), calling her “false/ and hateful” (10.868-69), her
sorrow and repentance assuaged his anger and he says, “let us no more contend, nor blame/
Each other, blam'd enough elsewhere, but strive/ In offices of Love” (10.958-960). Adam’s
evident change of heart implies his conscious choice to forgive Eve and choose love and
peace over hate and blame. His previous choice of hate and blame enhance the virtue of his
later choice of love and peace as it affirms how he has experienced both good and evil and is
now consciously choosing goodness. So, while humanity’s pride will reject Utopia’s
excessive control as we desire autonomy and freedom, humanity will achieve greater joy
after the Fall as our free will enhances the virtue of our conscious choice to pursue goodness.
Milton further argues that humanity’s virtue after the Fall will be more pleasing to us
since we must now freely choose to pursue virtue. This conscious choice would enhance
humanity’s joy in being virtuous because our virtue would now carry more significance than
it did if we simply chose it out of force or out of ignorance of evil. So, becoming aware of
evil through the Fall increases humanity’s joy at being virtuous as we may now exercise our
free will and consciously choose virtue; John C. Ulreich, Jr. supports this in “A Paradise
Within: The Fortunate Fall in Paradise Lost” where he argues that “For Milton, the only thing
that could possibly make the [Fall fortunate] is for it to be our guilt, the result of our own free
choice” (Ulreich 352). Ulreich further claims that “To be of value, to God or himself, man’s
love must be voluntary” (352). These arguments are supported by the text as God attributes
humanity’s fall to free will and commends this free will, claiming “Not free, what proof
could [humanity] have given sincere/ Of true allegiance, constant faith or love” (Milton
3.103-104), and asking “What pleasure I from such obedience paid, /When will and reason
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(reason also is choice)/ …Made passive both, had serv’d necessity, /Not me” (3.107-11). God
highlights the necessity of free will in offering genuine obedience and suggests that virtue
without conscious choice is unpleasing. This strengthens how, after the Fall, humanity’s
virtue is more pleasing as we are able to genuinely and consciously choose to pursue virtue.
Moreover, the Fall brings humanity greater joy as our conscious choice of virtue will
lead us to consciously experience the benefits of virtue. This greater joy is foreshadowed by
the angel Michael as he promises Adam and Eve that, though they must now leave Paradise,
they will come to possess “A Paradise within [themselves], happier far” (12.587). This joy is
also explained as Michael tells Adam, “Who seeks/ To lessen thee, against his purpose
serves/ To manifest the more thy might: his evil/ Thou usest, and from thence createst more
good” (8.613-16). These lines suggest that more good will come from the temptations of evil
as humanity may exhibit their fortitude in consciously resisting evil and choosing virtue.
Ulreich reflects my claim as he asserts how “morality depends…on the conscious avoidance
of [evil]” (Ulreich 355). A conscious choice to be virtuous would then increase humanity’s
joy as we would be consciously experiencing the benefits of virtue. In his article, Ulreich
argues that “Obedience enables man to imitate God, not only to be like Him but to become
more like Him” (362). In this sense, the Fall increases humanity’s joys as we may now
consciously strive to be more like God in our virtue. This is suggested in the text as God
predicts how humanity will, “by degrees of merit raised, /[…and] under long obedience tried”
(Milton 7.156-58), be joined with God in “One kingdom, joy and union without end” (7.161).
These lines emphasize humanity’s trials of obedience which, after the Fall, we must now
consciously undergo, and humanity’s levels of virtues which we must now consciously
cultivate. These conscious decisions to pursue virtue and obey God then increase our joy as
we consciously work towards being joined with God. Milton’s emphasis on how free will to
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choose to pursue virtue will bring humanity greater joy reflects More’s emphasis on how
human pride desires autonomy and will thus reject the overwhelming control of Utopia.

6. Instability as Ennobling, Imperfections as Glorifying
Finally, human pride (or human dignity or honour) would reject any Utopian practices
that cultivate the stable and perfect Utopian society because human pride prefers a degree of
instability where they can triumph over challenges, rather than a boring life of untroubled,
unchanging stability. Jordan B. Peterson supports this in his lecture, “Biblical Series VIII:
The Phenomenology of the Divine”, where he argues that “we’re not built for static utopia:
we’re built for a dynamic situation where there’s demands placed on us, and where there’s
the optimal amount of uncertainty” (Peterson, Biblical Series, unpaginated lecture). This
optimal amount of uncertainty would ennoble humanity by challenging us to overcome
obstacles and inspiring us to work towards certain goals. In contrast, the perfect society of
Utopia, where there is no adversity and no struggles, would bore humanity and eventually be
rejected. Peterson supports this as he asserts how “a utopian vision of perfection [is]
profoundly antihuman [as] human beings would go mad and break the system, smash it, just
so that something unexpected and crazy could happen” (Peterson). He explains that “human
beings don’t want utopian comfort and certainty. Human beings want adventure, chaos, and
uncertainty” (Peterson). More’s novel supports this assessment as it demonstrates a static,
boring perfection in the Utopians’ daily, idyllic schedules. For example, in a twenty-four
hour day, the Utopians “appoint six of these for work, three of which are before dinner and
three after; they then sup, and at eight o’clock, counting from noon, go to bed and sleep eight
hours” (More 62). Utopians leisurely go through their day with no excessive labour, plenty of
unoccupied time, and no obstacles or difficulties to be overcome. Over time, since
humanity’s pride has nothing to overcome, this lack of challenges and abundance of spare
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time would become boring and meaningless. Consequently, humanity would reject their
perfect utopian system for a system with a higher degree of instability that would allow them
to overcome challenges and thus be ennobled. So, human pride will desire a degree of
instability since a dynamic situation will challenge us compared to the static, idyllic lifestyle
of the Utopians that will only bore us.
Though Utopians “must employ [their free time] in some proper exercise” (More 62),
such as “public lectures every morning before daybreak” (62) or “[entertaining] each other
either with music or discourse”, this does not solve the problem of their static stability (63).
Though these practices ensure that Utopians constantly edify themselves and avoid vain or
evil pleasures, they do not ensure any challenges or difficulties for humanity’s pride to
overcome and feel ennobled by. In fact, the process of edifying themselves when there is no
adversity or afflictions around them may devalue the edification as meaningless since there
are no circumstances that would ever challenge or oppose their edification. Peterson explains
how challenging circumstances would benefit human pride as he explores “the successful
hero myth” (Peterson). He analyzes the story of Sleeping Beauty from a psychological
perspective, where the prince “escapes [the witch], and then conquers the worst thing that can
be imagined, and is ennobled by that” (Peterson). This shows how overcoming challenges
can elevate and dignify ourselves, thus benefitting humanity’s pride. So, Peterson’s lecture on
how human beings want, and are ennobled by, uncertainty strengthens the argument that
human pride, which seeks to overcome challenges for honor or glory, would reject Utopian
practices that create an overly stable society.
In another lecture, “Notes on Reality and the Sacred”, Peterson also supports this
argument as he explores the Daoist belief that the world “is made up essentially of chaos and
order”, and that “the optimally meaningful life is to be found on the border between chaos
and order” (Peterson, Notes on Reality, unpaginated lecture). He explains chaos as everything
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we do not understand, where “you’re at sea or overwhelmed or things have fallen apart for
you, and there’s too much of everything for you to deal with” (Peterson). Meanwhile, order is
everything we do understand, where “nothing that’s interesting ever happens to you, nothing
is anything but a repeat of all of all the things that you already know” (Peterson). Utopia’s
society highly favors order, where nothing new happens and they repeat the same familiar
routine every day (More 62). According to Peterson, this extreme does not provide an
‘optimally meaningful life’. Instead of extremes, he advocates for the border between chaos
and order where “you’re secure enough to be confident but not so secure that you’re bored,
and you’re interested enough to be awake but not so interested that you’re terrified”
(Peterson). This suggests that Utopian practices that cultivate stability and perfection will
create an overly ordered society that will bore humanity. This also suggests that humanity
will seek a degree of instability to challenge themselves and create a meaningful life. Both
these implications support my argument of how human pride (or human dignity) will reject
Utopian practices that create stability and perfection.
As More argues that humanity desires a degree of instability in order to overcome
challenges and be ennobled, so Milton argues that humanity achieves greater joys through the
Fall as we are glorified when we participate in God’s salvation and triumph over evil. Sarah
Van Der Laan supports this claim in “Waking Leucothea: An Unexplored Homeric Allusion
in Paradise Lost” as she argues how “Milton constructs his model of human salvation [by
presenting] human free will and an active partnership with the divine as heroic qualities,
harnessed for heroic endeavours” (Van Der Laan 78). Van Der Laan explores how
“Leukothea’s encounter with Odysseus illustrates the joint divine and human endeavour
necessary to accomplish salvation. God provides the tools for salvation, but human beings
must work with those tools, expending their own efforts to arrive safely at the shore” (75).
These human efforts to achieve the salvation that God offers then brings glory to ourselves
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and to God as we defeat evil, and Milton foreshadows this glory when he alludes to
Leucothea in Paradise Lost: “Leucothea waked; and with fresh dews imbalmed/ The earth”
(Milton 11.135-136). This allusion to humanity’s heroic efforts to achieve God’s salvation is
followed by descriptions of how Adam and Eve “found/ Strength added from above; new
hope to spring/ Out of despair” (11.137-39), and God’s “promise, that [Eve’s] seed shall
bruise [their] foe” (11.155). These descriptions foreshadow humanity’s glorious triumphs
over evil as God strengthens us against evil, grants us hope against temptation, and vows that
humanity will be able to fight back against evil. These descriptions also highlight the joint
effort of humanity and God to overcome evil; though God provides humanity with strength
and hope, humanity must choose to use those tools to fight their own battles against evil. So,
Milton’s allusion to Leucothea suggests how humanity achieves greater joys through the Fall
as we may choose to participate in God’s salvation and consequently triumph gloriously over
evil.
The ability to choose to participate in God’s salvation grants humanity a degree of
agency in overcoming our own temptations and challenges that then heightens our own
glorious triumphs over evil. Van Der Laan supports this as she notes “the critical work free
will must nevertheless do” (Van Der Laan 66) to participate in God’s salvation, arguing that
Milton focuses on “each individual’s responsibility for his or her own behaviour and
thoughts… and the power of men and women to affect their fate for good or ill” (67). This
human agency is emphasized by the Son as He foreshadows how humanity will be “Tried in
sharp tribulation, and refined/ By faith and faithful works” (Milton 11.63-64), which in turn
“Resigns [humanity] up with Heaven and Earth renewed” (11.66). This speech underscores
humanity’s effort in obtaining God’s salvation as the Son predicts how humanity will face
challenging trials and highlights the constant labour that they must perform. This emphasizes
each individual’s struggle with their own challenges and their own accountability in either
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overcoming and learning from those challenges or being defeated by those challenges. The
Son also places the onus on humanity to consistently cultivate and strengthen their faith and
their relationship with God. This all foreshadows humanity’s extensive efforts to participate
in God’s salvation. However, the Son’s speech also offers glory to humanity in eventually
being restored and resurrected, joining God and the Son in heaven. This glory is only
heightened by human agency and the onerous work that each individual must choose to do to
achieve this glory. So, the Son predicts how humanity will achieve glory through the Fall as
we may choose to work hard and triumph over evil. Overall, Milton’s suggests that humanity
achieves greater joy in our imperfection by accomplishing glorious triumphs over evil,
reflecting More’s suggestion that humanity desires a degree of instability to be ennobled by
overcoming challenges.

7. Conclusion
So far, I have outlined several Utopian practices that would realistically be rejected
due to human pride and explained several ways in which humanity achieves greater joys after
the Fall. Human pride would reject Utopian surveillance as we strive to avoid rebuke; Related
to this, humanity achieves greater joy after the Fall as we come to experience, not God’s
punishment or reproach, but His forgiveness. Next, human pride desires to be better than
others and would thus reject the social and economic uniformity in Utopia; Similarly,
humanity achieves greater joy after the Fall as we seek to better ourselves and thus please
God with our repentance. Human pride would also reject Utopian stability since a degree of
instability is required for humanity to overcome challenges and be ennobled; Likewise,
humanity achieves greater joy after the Fall as we are glorified when we triumph over evil.
Lastly, human pride would reject the overwhelming social control of Utopia as we desire to
be in control of our own decisions; In the same way, humanity achieves greater joys after the
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Fall as this heightens our free will in choosing virtue. These points argue for how Utopian
perfection is not realistically desirable or achievable as several practices required for that
perfection go against our natural pride. These points also argue for how humanity is able to
achieve greater joys in our current state of imperfection than in our pre-Fall state of
perfection.
These are important arguments because they imply that perfection is not realistically
desirable for humans, nor is it a guarantee of ultimate happiness for humans. If humanity
would naturally reject Utopian practices, then Utopian perfection is not in fact desirable for
humans. Likewise, if humanity can achieve greater joys in our state of imperfection, then
perfection is not the panacea for all human problems that we often assume it is. These
implications would, in turn, help ease the anxieties and miseries of those who strive for
perfection in their lives— these implications suggest that perfection, while firstly being
nearly impossible to achieve, is not even realistically desirable and will not make their lives
better or happier. Another important implication of my argument is that human nature thrives
under contexts of imperfection. Since humanity can achieve greater joys in our imperfections
and would reject Utopian practices that ensure a perfectly stable and prosperous society, it
follows that humans actually desire contexts of imperfection, such as Peterson’s example of a
state balanced between order and chaos. This implication would help people feel more at
peace with their present situations because they would acknowledge how their hardships can
help them grow and thrive, instead of viewing their struggles as imperfections that should be
eradicated. Overall, a reading of More’s Utopia and Milton’s Paradise Lost as questioning
the realistic desirability of perfection could help people feel more at peace with themselves
and their current circumstances.
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Appendix: Presentation at the SPU Honors Research Symposium
My honours project is entitled “The Realistic Desirability of Perfection in Thomas
More’s Utopia and John Milton’s Paradise Lost”. This topic explores a question that has
always been an area of interest and a cause of doubt in my religious faith. I have always
wondered if people really desire a perfect world and society and why or why not. This
question has serious religious implications for me as the answer will influence my perception
of the garden of Eden, heaven, and our capacity for happiness in a fallen world. My honours
project specifically shows how my English literature degree has supplemented and
strengthened my faith by allowing me to explore religious questions that the Bible has not
answered for me. Religious issues such as death, love, and sin are often addressed in works of
literature. By analyzing and interpreting such works, I receive different perspectives on
religious issues and can contemplate my own opinions on those issues. The two literary
works that I have studied are suitable to explore my topic as they both discuss perfect worlds.
Milton’s Paradise Lost describes the original Garden of Eden and how we lost that perfection
while More’s Utopia describes the extreme measures that would create a perfect society.
Though their reasonings differ, Milton and More both posit through their works that though
humanity thinks they desire perfection, they actually prefer contexts of imperfection; Milton
suggests how our fallenness enhances our relationship with God, allowing us to experience
God in a different way, such as grace, mercy, and forgiveness, while More suggests how
human pride makes perfection impossible and undesirable to humanity.
In Paradise Lost, several characters support my argument that humanity shall achieve
greater joys through the Fall. For example, as the angel Michael is escorting Adam and Eve
out of Eden, he comforts them by promising them a paradise that they will achieve within
themselves that will surpass the joy they had in Eden. So, Milton suggests that the Fall,
despite descending humanity into a state of imperfection, allows humanity to achieve greater
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happiness within that imperfect state. In More’s Utopia, the two characters’ ending comments
on utopian practices raise doubts on the feasibility and desirability of those practices. For
example, Hythloday praises Utopian practices and wishes that the world would be so wise as
to imitate them, but he also admits that it would be unrealistic to implement Utopian practices
in the world because human pride would be too big a hindrance. Human pride may be
interpreted as either a sinful pride (such as arrogance, vanity, or conceit) or a healthy pride
(such as self-esteem or dignity). Hythloday’s reference to human pride seems to assume the
first meaning, asserting how Utopia would be a perfect society if sinful pride did not reject it.
My paper will use both interpretations of human pride to show how Utopian perfection would
be rejected. My first two points use the first interpretation of sinful pride to heighten how
humanity is imperfect and will thus not accept or fit in a perfect world or society. I
supplement these points with my analysis of Milton’s Paradise Lost that suggests how we are
happier in imperfect contexts anyways. My last two points use the second interpretation of
healthy pride to highlight how Utopian perfection necessarily violates humanity’s self-worth
and dignity, and does not allow humanity to redeem their fallenness by striving against evil. I
strengthen these points with my analysis of Milton’s Paradise Lost that shows how contexts
of imperfection do allow for these things.
So in my first point, to explore my topic of the realistic desirability of perfection, I
discuss how human pride would reject Utopian practices that open them to endless rebuke
from others, such their extensive surveillance practices where everyone observes everyone. I
compare this endless rebuke of Utopia with Milton’s suggestion of how humanity’s
fallenness leads us to greater joys by allowing us to experience God in new and different
ways, such as through His mercy, grace and forgiveness. Contrasting the rebuke in Utopia
with the forgiveness of a fallen world reveals how the measures necessary for the perfection
of Utopia will be rejected by human pride and how we will find greater joys in the contexts
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of imperfection of a fallen world as our fallenness allows us to experience being forgiven and
receiving mercy and grace. Next, I explore how the Utopian practices that enforce social and
economic uniformity would be rejected by human pride because human pride pushes people
to strive to be different (and thus better) than others. I compare this with More’s suggestion
of how we achieve greater joy in our imperfect, fallen state as we seek to better ourselves and
repent to God, thus pleasing Him. This comparison shows how utopian practices would be
rejected as people desire to be better than others while More’s fallen world leads to joy as
humanity can now seek to better themselves. So, the very reason a utopian practice (which
allegedly leads to perfection) would be rejected becomes the same source of joy in a fallen
world.
In my next point, I explore how the Utopian practices that assert an overwhelming
control over the personal lives of utopians would be rejected as humanity’s pride desires
autonomy. I compare this with Milton’s argument that humanity gains greater joys through
the Fall as we must now consciously choose to accept God’s grace. This comparison
demonstrates how utopian practices would be rejected because they reduce humanity’s
agency over their own lives while Milton’s fallen world leads to joy as it increases
humanity’s agency to live in sin or accept God’s grace. Finally, I explore how human pride
would reject any Utopian practices that cultivate the stable and perfect Utopian society
because human pride prefers a degree of instability where they can triumph over challenges,
rather than a boring life of untroubled, unchanging stability. I compare this with Milton’s
argument of how humanity achieves greater joys through the Fall as we are glorified when
we participate in God’s salvation and triumph over evil. This comparison illustrates how
utopian perfection would be rejected as too stable while Milton’s fallen world provides joy as
the instability provided by sin allows humanity to be glorified when we triumph over it. All
my points explore how utopian practices that cultivate perfection are not realistically
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desirable, several practices would be rejected for various reasons. Meanwhile, all these points
of contention are reversed in the contexts of imperfections in a fallen world to lead to greater
joys. For example, we would reject utopian practices that enforce uniformity because we
strive to be different and thus better than others, and this desire to be better leads to greater
joy in a fallen world as we seek to better ourselves.
I conclude my paper by exploring the implications of my research: my arguments
imply that perfection is not realistically desirable for humans, nor is it a guarantee of ultimate
happiness for humans. This could help ease the anxieties and miseries of those who strive for
perfection in their lives as these implications suggest that perfection, while firstly being
nearly impossible to achieve, is not even realistically desirable and will not make their lives
better or happier. Another important implication of my argument is that human nature thrives
under contexts of imperfection. This implication would help people feel more at peace with
their present situations because they would acknowledge how their hardships can help them
grow and thrive, instead of viewing their struggles as imperfections that should be eradicated.
Overall, a reading of More’s Utopia and Milton’s Paradise Lost as questioning the realistic
desirability of perfection could help people feel more at peace with themselves and their
current circumstances.
One topic that my research paper relates to is how research is a process of inquiry
where we ask a question, we conduct research to answer that question, we conclude our
research not only with an answer to our original question but also with multiple other
questions that sprang from our research, and hopefully we continue to search for answers to
the never-ending stream of questions. My research paper demonstrates this process of inquiry
as it began with a religious question I had contemplated for some time which was, what will
heaven be like? From within my context of sin and imperfection, I tried to understand the
concept of heaven where everything would be made perfect. I could not find a model that was

Tan 36
agreeable to me because if we entered heaven as we are we would make it imperfect, but if
our imperfections were purged from us then we would not be ourselves. However, given the
Christian assumption that everything will be made perfect in heaven, I concluded that the first
model of heaven (where we enter as we are, thus making heaven imperfect) could be rejected
and the second model of heaven (where our imperfections are purged from us) could be
accepted. So, this answered my original question of what heaven will be like. But this then
led me to another question as my image of heaven then consisted of people that were not
quite human, happiness that was not quite joy. This led me to question why I viewed
perfection in heaven so strangely, and I concluded that it may be because I saw imperfections
and flaws as intrinsic to humanity and to our happiness. This conclusion confused me
because it suggested that perfection is not perfect (or at least it does not offer perfect
happiness) while imperfection is preferable (and offers a richer joy than perfection does).
So, this answer finally led me to the question of my research paper: do humans
realistically desire perfection or are we happier within our contexts of imperfection? I
conducted research to answer this question by focusing on two literary works that provide
examples of both a perfect society and a fallen society. By analysing these texts and
comparing them, I was able to explore the measures necessary for perfection, the feasibility
of implementing these measures in a human society, the mindsets in a fallen society, and the
joys available to those in a fallen society. My research yielded the following answers to my
question: perfection is not realistically desirable in a human society because we live within
contexts of imperfection and these contexts also allow for several joys that contexts of
perfection do not allow for. I think these answers are important because it could help people
who strive for perfection understand that perfection is an unattainable ideal. This could help
them feel more at peace with their own progress or status, thus creating a healthier and more
effective mindset for them to strive to improve themselves. However, since research is a
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process of inquiry that should never end, the conclusion of my research paper has created
several new lines of inquiry to be explored. For example, if perfection is not realistically
desirable and does not make us happier, this means that we should accept our flaws and our
sins. But how can we know how to moderate this and consolidate our acceptance of our flaws
with a constant struggle to improve ourselves? When may we embrace our fallenness and
when must we repent for our sins? On the other hand, there could be religious implications
from the conclusions of my research paper. My conclusion was that perfection is not
realistically desirable in human societies. This could make someone question the realistic
desirability of heaven but it could also support our strong need for God since perfection by
ourselves is not perfect. If perfection by itself is insufficient in making us happy, this may
suggest our need for something more, something spiritual or divine, like a god. This could
lead to questions about heaven and how we will be changed in heaven and how exactly we
will be happy in that context of perfection.
On another note, religion necessarily coincides with morality as our moral systems
and values are created or dependant on our religious beliefs. So, my project also relates to
how humans are moral, believing animals as it alludes to a Christian sense of perfection. In
Christianity, there is the idea that when we die, we will be resurrected and ascend to heaven
where we, and everything else, will be made perfect. This idea is entrenched in the doctrine
that God makes humans inherently perfect but the flawed world that we live in inevitably
makes us imperfect sinners. So, because we are made by God, we have an intrinsic perfection
within us, but as soon as we are born into this fallen world we are tainted and can be seen as
sinners. This doctrine of perfection provides a context for some believers to live in that
reminds them that perfection and perfect happiness will be attained in the afterlife. This can
be a source of joy and comfort for some people as they look forward to a state of eternal
perfection in the afterlife while they live within this world that they view as imperfect and
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sinful. However, some people who believe in this doctrine of perfection (that we have an
intrinsic perfection within us) may begin striving for perfection in their current situations.
These people may view hardships or struggles as imperfections and begin working
incessantly to fix those imperfections or feel bad about those imperfections. This mindset is
unsustainable as it cultivates the habit of fixating on what’s going wrong and thus fixating on
one’s own inability to make things perfect and failing to reward or acknowledge one’s own
achievements. This leads to the belief that one is never good enough. This becomes a
demoralizing state of mind that would eventually lead to burn out. Furthermore, as I explore
in the conclusion of my research paper, this desire for perfection is not sustainable nor the
key to perfect happiness. In fact, as I just mentioned, striving for perfection may be highly
detrimental to our happiness and effectiveness. This desire for perfection is not sustainable
because we live in a flawed world so our quest for perfection will inevitably and incessantly
fall short, causing us to work harder and harder for something that is unattainable. This will
lead to a huge detriment on our mental health, our morale, and our self-esteem as we
convince ourselves that we are striving for something reasonable and attainable, and that the
reason we fail to attain it is due to something inferior within ourselves. In addition to
perfection being an unattainable ideal, my research paper also explores how, even if we did
attain perfection, we would inevitably reject it because we prefer our contexts of imperfection
and the liberties and joys that those contexts allow us. For example, the Utopian practices that
create a perfect, stable and safe society would be rejected because we prefer our contexts of
imperfection that allows for some instability. This instability allows us to be challenged and
allows us to test ourselves, to fail or succeed in these trials.
So, not only is chasing perfection unsustainable, it is also not the road to perfect
happiness since this pursuit would reduce our happiness and because we would reject
perfection even if we did attain it. In my research paper, I conclude that a more sustainable
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way of navigating our contexts of imperfection is to accept them and to strive, not for a
perfection that is vague and unattainable, but to simply improve and better oneself. Chasing
perfection within our contexts of imperfection is like running a race with no finish line. We
frantically run faster and faster, desperate to reach the finish line, but we gradually get more
tired and defeated, and there is no prize or end goal on the horizon. However, accepting our
contexts of imperfection and striving to gradually improve ourselves is more like walking
uphill, with small checkpoints. This is a much more sustainable mode of being as we strive to
better ourselves, but we are not frantic or desperate because we can set attainable goals for
ourselves that we can realistically see ourselves achieving. This method of navigating our
contexts of imperfection also has several checkpoints where we can rest or reward ourselves
for our efforts and achievements. This creates a healthy state of mind that acknowledges our
own imperfections but is not defeated by them or desperate to escape them. Instead, this state
of mind is happier by accepting our contexts of imperfection as it can now create attainable
and realistic goals. By doing this, we strike a balance between striving to improve ourselves
and accepting our imperfections. Neither complacent nor frantic, this state of mind can
gracefully assess ourselves and create realistic goals to improve ourselves.
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